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1. Introduction 
 
The Neoclassical Economics – which is the domi-
nating form of Mainstream Economics – believes in the 
"goodness" of the market economy – as opposed to the 
planned one – because it generates both microeconomic 
efficiency (in terms of optimal allocation of scarce soci-
ety's resources) and macroeconomic performance (in 
terms of full employment, the general price level stabil-
ity and both high and steady economic growth). There-
fore, mainstream economists advocated the Big-Bang 
(BB) or the Shock Therapy rather than the Gradualism 
(GR) strategy of transition from the planned economy to 
the market one. According to their point of view, the 
quicker such transition will take place, the better. The 
planned economy means microeconomic inefficiency 
(waste of resources etc.) and bad macroeconomic out-
comes (low productivity etc.). It is necessary quickly to 
break the old system and simultaneously implement all 
desirable policies: price liberalization, privatization, fi-
nancial stabilization (it is an essence of the BB). And 
then economic freedom for everybody will rapidly give 
optimal outcomes.  
The reasoning about both the "goodness" of the 
market economy and the necessity of the BB (explicitly 
or, sometimes, implicitly) is based on the assumption 
that economic agents (first of all, households and firms) 
always and everywhere maximize their objective func-
tions. They are optimizers. In other words, the Neoclas-
sical Economics is based on the fundamental idea of the 
Substantive Rationality (Lavoie 1992, P. 51). According 
to Lah and Susjan (1999, P. 589): “Within the frame-
work of substantive rationality, the conditions and con-
straints for the rational behavior of economic agents 
(utility or profit maximization) are external, that is, de-
termined and given in their environment. According to 
Herbert Simon, such behavior is determined entirely by 
the characteristics of the environment in which it exists. 
However, these characteristics have to be known. The 
concept of substantive rationality therefore assumes that 
economic agents make their decisions (based on com-
plex mathematical calculations) in an environment of 
perfect information. 
However, the reality does not allow economic 
agents to be optimizers always and everywhere. There 
are serious problems of both uncertainty of the future 
and information overload (Hodgson 1997; Lah and 
Susjan 1999). As Lavoie (1994, P. 543-544) has pointed 
out: “In the real world, in contrast to neoclassical mod- 
els, agents lack perfect knowledge and the ability to pro- 
cess a large amount of information. They generally lack 
confidence in their information and their assessment of 
it. The substantive rationality of neoclassical models can 
be neither a guide nor a description of decision making” 
(see also Lavoie, 2006, ch. 1). 
These problems play important role in the devel-
oped market economies (see the Section 2) and can de-
stabilize the transition ones (the Section 3) by means of 
adverse effect on the behavior of both households (the 
Sections 4 and 5) and firms (the Section 6). Therefore 
the presence of such problems itself can be the base for 
the fundamental objections to the BB mode of transition 
to the market economy (see the conclusive Section 7). 
 
2. The Informational Obstacles to Rational  
Behavior in the Developed Market Economy 
 
The presence of obstacles to rational behavior in 
the developed market economy has been broadly recog-
nized in the Heterodox Economics, especially in the 
Post Keynesianism (Lavoie 1994; 2006; Davidson 
1996) and Evolutionary Institutionalism (Hodgson 
1994; 1997). The point is that optimizing behavior can 
take place only if there is a correspondence between the 
cognitive possibilities of agents and the information set. 
If information stock is very big or complex or if agents 
have no relevant data at all (Hodgson 1997), they cannot 
behave rationally in the Neoclassical fashion and are 
forced to develop various ways dealing with these diffi-
culties. Such behavior is consistent with so-called Pro-
cedural Rationality (Lavoie 1994, P. 544): “Such ap-
proach to rationality, in cases of uncertainty or of insuf-
ficient capabilities to process existing information, con-
sists of means to avoid complex calculations and con-
siderations, and of procedures enabling decisions to be 
taken despite incomplete information. Agents follow 
procedures that are sensible given their bounded 
knowledge and computational capabilities”.  
It leads to institutional evolution. In other words, 
households and firms develop diverse informal institu-
tions in order to solve the problems of both information 
overload and uncertainty of the future. These informal 
institutions include habits and rules of thumb, moral 
rules, entrepreneurial culture, long-terms links between 
industry and banking etc. (Lah and Susjan 1999; Tsang 
1996; Lavoie 2006) Such devices create what I would 
like to call the "stabilizing frameworks". The "stabiliz- 
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ing frameworks" are those elements of the economic 
system, which provide favorable environment for mak- 
ing sensible economic decisions (i.e. eliminate any ex-
tremes of the information problems). The important 
point is that economic evolution requires "smooth addi-
tions" to the "stabilizing frameworks". For example, the 
transition from the craft production system to the mass 
production one requires the "framework" in the form of 
"mass marketing" (Nell 1998, P. 232-233), and the 
emergence of endogenous inside money requires the 
"framework" in the form of the Central-Bank-As-A-
Lender-Of-Last-Resort (Minsky 1986).   
Without such "frameworks", economic system 
would collapse in complete chaos. Destruction of some 
of these "frameworks" can be very harmful for eco-
nomic system. That is why, for example, Keynes re-
jected the decrease in the money wage level as a means 
of struggle against unemployment because according to 
his view contracts fixing money wage are one of the im-
portant stabilizers (Keynes 1936, ch. 19, 20; Davidson 
1972; 1999, P. 583).  
 
3. The Informational Obstacles to Rational  
Behavior in the Transitional Economy:  
The General Perspective 
 
The transitional economy as the system moving 
from the “planned socialism” to the “market capitalism” 
is by definition is characterized by shift in its institu-
tional bases. Such shift itself leads to enormous obsta-
cles to rational behavior. However, the situation be-
comes worse when the BB takes place because such 
strategy means not shift but break in the institutional 
base of the economic system. The "institutional hiatus" 
(Kozul-Wright and Rayment 1997) takes place: old in-
stitutional frameworks have already destroyed, but new 
ones have yet not created. We have no Schumpeterian 
"creative destruction" under the BB; we have only "de-
stroying destruction".  
The obvious example is the transitional economy 
of Russia in the 1990s. In 1991, this country had still 
some analogue of the planned economy. The 1992 year 
was first year of the BB reforming. The outcomes were 
the following: privatization without rules of law, price 
liberalization without workable competition, the gov-
ernment refusal from enterprise administration and con-
trol without emergence of efficient entrepreneurship and 
management, advertisement of "luxury life" without in-
troduction of moral rules of civil society, etc. The result 
was economic and legal chaos in the form of both enor-
mous information overload in the sphere of consump-
tion decisions and extreme uncertainty in the sphere of 
investment and portfolio decisions (the same informa-
tional problems appeared in other transition economies, 
for example, in Slovenia - see Lah and Susjan (1999)).  
The point is that these information problems did not per- 
mit agents to be consistent in their behavior not only  
with the Substantive Rationality, but also sometimes 
even with the Procedural Rationality (i.e. there were 
cases without individual deliberate choice at all). It led 
to adverse both microeconomic and macroeconomic 
consequences. In order to describe such consequences 
we will divide all Russian economic agents into three 
broad categories: "poor households" (the "typical Post-
Soviet Russians"), "rich households" (the "New Rus-
sians") and "firms". It seems to us that this taxonomy is 
very useful because it is true indicator of the behavioral 
structure in the Russian economy in the 1990s (although 
often two last groups could be treated as the same, be-
cause some firms are controlled by the "New Rus-
sians"). We will trace the influence of the BB on behav-
ior of each of these groups of people and show why they 
all could not behave rationally. 
 
4. The Informational Obstacles to Rational  
Behavior of the "Poor Households" 
 
"Poor households" are typical Russian people, 
which became very poor after the BB reforming. In the 
1990s many such agents had income which was less 
than "minimal consumption bundle". It means that they 
were on the lowest level of famous «Maslow pyramid»: 
they hardly satisfied their physiological needs.  We be-
lieve that the main types of decisions of this category of 
agents - consumption/saving and portfolio ones – had 
made in the conditions, which are very adverse to ra-
tional behavior. The consumption decisions were mak-
ing in the situation of both massive inflow of imported 
goods with unknown quality and characteristics (Lah 
and Susjan 1999, P.593-600) and (as I already men-
tioned above) extremely low income without access to 
external finance, that is, very hard budget constraint. 
Furthermore, that typical Russian people had no "con-
sumption culture" and (this is very important) custom 
and experience of making economic choices, because 
the planned economy of shortage (Kornai 1980) was the 
economy of almost total rationing which, to some ex-
tent, excludes free choice.  
All these aspects are reasons for both information 
overload in the sphere of consumption decisions and 
non-rational behavior of Russian people in this sphere. 
Both surveys and economic intuition show that many 
consumption goods purchases had completed on the 
base of aggressive advertisement pressure or just emo-
tions. The "lightning" calculations "of pleasures and 
pains" (Veblen 1898, P. 389) were often completely ab-
sent. Sometimes these agents could not take into account 
any benefits and costs of their decisions because they 
were not to able to collect and to understand relevant 
information or because this information was too com-
plex for them (the problems of Extensiveness and Com- 
plexity as the two kinds of information overload - see 
Hodgson 1997, P.668-671). It is obvious that such deci-
sions were very far from optimal ones.  
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In the sphere of portfolio decisions, poor house-
holds faced with another general information problem - 
uncertainty. Various financial companies offered ex-
tremely high returns for own shares, stocks, bonds, pa-
pers and so on. The households had no both knowledge 
and experience of "working on" with financial instru-
ments. As a result, enormous quantity of Ponzi-finance-
using financial companies had emerged and made a lot 
of money, not as an effect of adverse macroeconomic 
dynamics (Minsky 1986; Nishi 2012), but as an effect 
of non-rational behavior of many typical Russian house-
holds.  
Non-rational behavior of typical Russian house-
holds can be well explained by Keynes’s conception of 
"conventional judgement" (Keynes 1937). In conditions 
of uncertainty, some agents follow other agents, and the 
"orientation on average opinion" took place. The opti-
mistic mood of this "average opinion" was very long 
supported by aggressive mass media advertisement of 
many lucky financial companies. The results were en-
richments of some cheating minority of agents, the huge 
loss of money of majority of other ones, and fundamen-
tal absence of trust and confidence of people to financial 
markets.  
We suppose also that another important behavioral 
reason for it was mix of very low income and the Rus-
sian traditional desire "to get all at once". For many peo-
ple purchase of "junk papers" of companies like MMM 
was the only trial of quick run away from misery. Some 
people who had bought such "securities" in the begin-
ning of expansion of "pyramids" have really escaped 
from misery.   
These consequences could be nil if the freedom of 
financial markets would appear slowly. Even the expe-
rience of advanced countries shows that stock markets 
often destabilize the economy (Singh 1995, P.104).  
It should not to forget that the Soviet economy was 
system without financial markets. Therefore, the most 
participants of the transitional financial markets in Post-
Soviet Russia had no skills for rational decision-making 
(Rozmainsky 2010). 
The emergence of financial markets without nor-
mal private sector and rules of law was one of the mis-
takes of the BB strategy and led to mass cases of non-
rational decision-making and, as a consequence, to non-
optimal decisions. Now, twenty years later, both the 
backwardness of financial markets and lack of confi-
dence of the most Russian households to these markets 
are serious obstacles to steady economic growth in Rus-
sia. 
 
5. The Informational Obstacles to Rational  
Behavior of the "Rich Households" 
 
The budget constraints of the "New Russians" were 
not so hard. However, all other reasons for non-rational  
behavior took place. Moreover, there was one "addi-
tional" one: the "group pressure". In other words, the 
consumption decisions of the “New Russians” were di-
rected by very strict requirements to their "life-styles" as 
the "Rich People". The phenomenon of "Conspicuous 
Consumption" described by Veblen (Mouhammed 
1999, P. 596; Trezzini 2011, P. 503; Kapeller and 
Schutz 2015, P. 53-55) took place in all its complete-
ness. Both surveys and economic intuition show that 
many purchases of the "New Russians" were the result 
of the desire to be in accordance with the "life style". 
However, it is not substantive rational behavior because 
such one means independent, atomistic choice of pur-
chased item.  Perhaps, the formation of the "class" of the 
"New Russians" with closed structure and strict require-
ments to consumption was itself an effect of the BB. The 
point is that in the conditions of both inflow of mass of 
new imported goods ("invasion of Western goods" - see 
Lah and Susjan 1999, P. 594) and absence of normal life 
styles (in general and consumption patterns in particu-
lar) created by slow evolutionary way, such patterns 
have rapidly embodied in distorted forms.  
By the way, such behavior was harmful for macro-
economic performance because goods forming "life-
styles" of the "Rich People" are at large foreign. It 
means that described consumption culture of the New 
Russians encouraged economic growth abroad but not 
inside the country. These consumption patterns are one 
of the long-term reasons for general economic back-
wardness of the Post-Soviet Russia (this backwardness 
is so evident since 2014). Possibly, if behavior of rich 
households would be more rational that their consump-
tion pattern would be more preferable for the domestic 
macroeconomic performance and steady economic 
growth not based on rising oil prices.  
 
6. The Informational Obstacles to Rational  
Behavior of Firms 
 
The Russian firms faced with the informational ob-
stacles to rational behavior in the sphere, which is "con-
ventionally" interested for Heterodox Economics, espe-
cially Post Keynesianism. This sphere is the fixed capi-
tal investment decisions.  
We cannot say about it something radically new. 
The idea of the negative influence of uncertainty of the 
future on fixed investment is the common theme in 
many heterodox books and articles, especially of Post 
Keynesian authors (Keynes 1936, ch.12; Davidson 
1972; Minsky 1986; Rotheim 1999; Lavoie 2006). We 
already mentioned above that the BB have generated ex-
treme uncertainty of the future. In this environment, the 
Russian firms had no any bases for sensible investment 
decision-making. It was not very surprising (at least, for 
Heterodox Economists) that collapse of fixed invest-
ment had appeared. 
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However, there is reverse side of the story about 
influence of uncertainty on behavior of firms in the Rus-
sian economy. The environment characterized by im-
possibility of exact calculations created incentives for 
various “shadow” and "black" activities ranging from 
trials to hide tax payments to real criminal acts. In other 
words, many Russian firms were engaged in the 1990s 
in diverse forms of the "shadow economy". The Russian 
Capitalism of the 1990s was emerged as the Criminal 
Capitalism. According to some data, in 1992 and 1993 
the amount of illegal appropriation of wealth in Russia 
by private agents was equal to 75-80% of GDP; in 1996 
(when law framework became already a little more 
clear) it was equal to 12-15% of GDP (Shmelyov 1997). 
It is not surprising that now both businesses of many in-
fluential Russian actors have criminal origin, and some 
actions of the Russian governmental officers violate (in-
ternational or domestic) law. 
The very important thing is that criminal and other 
shadow and black activities require adequate finance for 
itself. The transactions with heroin or simple bribe are 
usually not financed by bank money. Agents want to 
have means of financing which allow to hide activity 
from the "third parties". Such means are cash, barter and 
"non-payments" (arrears). These means - unlike bank 
money - are anonymous. That is why the Russian mon-
etary system of the 1990s had been characterized by dis-
placement of bank money by cash, barter and non-pay-
ments (Rozmainsky 2014). Although in 1999 – 2001 the 
problem of barter and arrears was solved (by both rapid 
economic recovery and some decisions by Primakov’s 
government), big share of cash in total money supply 
remains structural weakness of the Russian monetary 
system. Furthermore, during the 1990s the Russian 
economy was significantly demonetized. In turn, de-
monetization is the "public bad" because, to some ex-
tent, it led to disintegration of the unified economy, its 
transformation into big quantity of weakly linked «is-
lands». This problem is actual for the Russian economy 
so far. 
The roots of all these problems are in the beginning 
of 1990s when the BB reforming led to the situation that 
shadow activities became both economically appeal and 
morally not bad. It seems that slow evolutionary transi-
tion would hardly generate such consequence.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
The GDP of the Russian economy during the 1990s 
have fallen more than twice, and the level of real fixed 
capital investment in 1999 was less than 25 percent of 
this level in 1990. These are indicators of very bad mac-
roeconomic performance of the economy in these years 
and, of course, the big mistakes in reforming it. Today 
we can see incarnations of consequences of these errors 
in, for example, very outdated and obsolete equipment 
of many Russian enterprises (the average age of indust- 
rial fixed capital was more than 20 years in 2004, and 
later data are not published at all). Why was shock so 
great?  
Mainstream economists stressed importance of po-
litical struggle against reforms and so on. It seems to us 
that the fundamental mistake is the chosen mode of re- 
forming: the BB. This paper have showed that the BB 
means rapid breakdown of old institutional system with-
out creating new one. It leads to great informational ob-
stacles to rational behavior. Economic agents cannot be-
have not only according to the Substantive Rationality, 
but also sometimes even according to the Procedural Ra-
tionality. It means that economic actions often were not 
based on the rational decision-making process and were 
driven by emotions, advertising, group pressure etc. We  
have demonstrated that in the sphere of consumption de-
cisions agents either followed emotional shifts and pres-
sure by advertising ("poor households") or tried to be in 
accordance with requirements of their narrow social 
group ("rich households"). In the sphere of portfolio de-
cisions, many holders of financial assets were fooled by 
financial companies. These cases of cheating were due 
to non-rational and often just stupid behavior. In the in-
vestment sphere, because of uncertainty many firms re-
placed fixed investment by engagement in the “shadow” 
and "black" activities. All these decisions and activities 
were both effect of informational obstacles to rational 
behavior and cause of both microeconomic inefficiency 
and bad macroeconomic performance of the Russian 
economy in the 1990s. 
It is necessary to understand that the illusions of the 
Substantive Rationality are misleading: agents cannot 
optimize always and everywhere. But they can make 
sensible decisions (Davidson 1991), both recognizing 
the limits to their cognitive and calculating possibilities 
and using various informal institutions (links between 
industry and banking, brand-loyalty, guarantees, rules of 
thumb) in order to deal with the different informational 
problems. The point is that these institutions - or as I 
called them "stabilizing frameworks" - are the result of 
slow evolutionary development. They cannot be created 
during, for example, a one week. It means that success-
ful transition from the planned economy to the market 
one takes also a lot of time and requires many stages. In 
other words, the GR would be more efficient and effec-
tive means of transition than the BB.  
To 1999 – 2001, some "stabilizing frameworks" 
had been created. We could speak about some long-term 
relationships between some enterprises and some banks, 
about the cases of defense of consumer rights, about the 
presence of (although very imperfect) system of prop-
erty rights and so on. It was one of the causes of the fact 
that since 1999 the Russian economy became to expand 
and seemed successful until 2008.  
Unfortunately, rooted traditions of non-rational be-
havior allowed prevented to create in Post-Soviet Russia 
efficient institutional environment, which is favorable to 
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economic growth. Lack of it can be visible especially 
after both fall in prices of oil and radical political deci-
sions in 2014. We suppose that – unlike many “liberal-
oriented” thinkers – one of the causes of non-rational 
behavior was the BB. The paper argues that such re-
forming was extremely expensive! 
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Розмаїнський І. В. Стратегія великого по-
штовху і нераціональна поведінка в российській 
перехідній економіці в 1990-ті роки 
У статті висувається гіпотеза про те, що страте-
гія великого поштовху (шокової терапії), яка засто-
совувалася в 1990-ті роки для реформування росій-
ської економіки підвищила ступінь нераціонально-
сті поведінки пересічних російських громадян. 
Справа в тому, що для повністю раціонального 
прийняття рішень необхідно, щоб людина не стика-
лася ні з нестачею інформації, ні з інформаційним 
перевантаженням. Радикальний «перехід до ринку», 
нав'язаний стратегією великого поштовху, посилив 
обидві ці перешкоди для раціональної поведінки. З 
одного боку, радикальні реформи підвищили сту-
пінь невизначеності майбутнього. З іншого боку, ці 
реформи привели до того, що пересічні громадяни 
зіткнулися з великою кількістю складної для сприй-
няття інформації, в першу чергу, на товарних і фі-
нансових ринках. Поточні соціально-політичні та 
економічні проблеми сучасної Росії пов'язані, зок-
рема із низьким ступенем раціональності поведінки 
багатьох її громадян. Коріння цього – в тому числі й 
в стратегії великого поштовху початку 1990-х років. 
Ключові слова: стратегія великого поштовху, 
шокова терапія, нераціональна поведінка, невизна-
ченість, інформаційне перевантаження, неортодок-
сальна економіка. 
 
Розмаинский И. В. Стратегия большого 
толчка и нерациональное поведение в россий-
ской переходной экономике в 1990-е годы 
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В статье выдвигается гипотеза о том, что стра-
тегия большого толчка (шоковой терапии), приме-
нявшаяся в 1990-е годы для реформирования рос-
сийской экономики, повысила степень нерацио-
нальности поведения рядовых российских граждан. 
Дело в том, что для полностью рационального при-
нятия решений необходимо, чтобы человек не стал-
кивался ни с нехваткой информации, ни с информа- 
ционной перегрузкой. Радикальный «переход к 
рынку», навязанный стратегией большого толчка, 
усилил оба эти препятствия для рационального по-
ведения. С одной стороны, радикальные реформы 
повысили степень неопределенности будущего. С 
другой стороны, эти реформы привели к тому, что 
рядовые граждане столкнулись с большим количе-
ством сложной для восприятия информации, в 
первую очередь, на товарных и финансовых рынках. 
Текущие социально-политические и экономические 
проблемы современной России связаны, в частно-
сти, и с низкой степенью рациональности поведения 
многих ее граждан. Корни этого – в том числе и в 
стратегии большого толчка начала 1990-х годов. 
Ключевые слова: стратегия большого толчка, 
шоковая терапия, нерациональное поведение, не-
определенность, информационная перегрузка, неор-
тодоксальная экономика. 
 
Rozmainsky I. V. The Big-bang Strategy and 
Non-rational Behavior in the Russian Transitional 
Economy in the 1990s 
The paper offers the following hypothesis: the Big 
Band (Shock Therapy) strategy of the 1990s in Russia 
has led to more non-rational behavior of the ordinary 
Russian people. The point is that in order to make com-
pletely rational decisions a person needs avoid both lack 
of information and information overload. Radical “tran-
sition to the market system” by means of the Big Bang 
strategy had reinforced both these obstacles to rational 
behavior. On the one hand, radical reforms had in-
creased uncertainty. On the other hand, due to these re-
forms ordinary Russian people faced with big amount of 
information which was complex for perception, first of 
all, on goods and financial markets. The contemporary 
social, political and economic problems of Russia are 
concerned, in particular, with low degree of rationality 
of many its citizens. Roots of it are, among others, in the 
Big Bang strategy of the 1990s. 
Keywords: the Big Bang strategy, shock therapy, 
non-rational behavior, uncertainty, information over-
load, heterodox economics. 
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